KABX · 19.87 · Abraxas · paper · September 23, 2026

Homosexuality: Is It Morally Permissible?

Philosophy 1003, Ethics. University of Minnesota, 1985. Final paper.

The typed original of this paper survived in a photo album and was scanned in September 2026. It is the paper cited in The Machine Question (section 1, note 6) for the example of the rock that does not come back down. It came back with five questions in the margin that I never answered. This version answers them. The instructor’s corrections are applied, the objection is now classified as deontological, which the instructor pointed out and I had got wrong, and the objection itself is stated more carefully than I stated it then. The structure and the argument are otherwise as I wrote them.

When discussing any topic that deals with human sexuality one must deal with a very wide spectrum of opinions. One side says that sex is for one purpose only, that of procreation. The conservatives insist that sex should only be had by a married couple with the intention of bearing children, thus contraception or any form of sex that precludes conception is not acceptable. Of course homosexuality falls into this category because there is no chance of conception.

On the other hand we have liberals who say that sex can be a satisfying form of expression for humans whether or not bearing of children is involved and therefore we should treat it as such. Just as there are rules to protect children playing in a schoolyard or two soccer teams on a field, there should exist rules which will keep the parties involved from injury. Other than that the pleasure and satisfaction derived from sex should be unfettered. The liberal view says that as long as both parties are in agreement and know the circumstances without deceit, sex is morally permissible and therefore homosexuality is also permissible.

This liberal view does rule out certain types of sexuality, where one of the parties involved is hurt in one way or another, or is used as a means rather than as an end in himself or herself. It would seem to me that those who hold the liberal view that sex is permissible as long as both parties are informed and in agreement would have to accept homosexuality as morally permissible, but this is not always the case. There are those who believe that there is something basically bad, sick, or unnatural about this sexual practice. One must realize that “bad,” “sick,” and “unnatural” are not necessarily the same thing, nor do they imply one another.

There seems to be a third position, between these two, that is held by many heterosexuals. They accept the liberal premise: sex can be an expression of love even though it does not end in conception, and many of them deliberately use forms of contraception. But they won’t accept the liberal conclusion where homosexuality is concerned, because of some deep-rooted objection or fear. Since the premise they accept leads to the conclusion they reject, they owe us a further reason, and the objection I take up below is the strongest one I know of. On what that objection is based is the question one must ask in trying to make a moral decision on this topic. I will first give an argument that homosexuality is permissible, then state the objection as fairly as I can, and then reply to it.

Argument

One of the formulations of Immanuel Kant’s categorical imperative says that it is immoral for one person to treat another merely as a means to an end. It is important to note the “merely” in his statement, because it is impossible to achieve many of our goals without the use of other people; we should not, however, use them simply as a vehicle.¹ So it is with sexual satisfaction. We need other people in order to satisfy our sexual desires, but it is morally wrong to treat these people merely as means to our own satisfaction. Therefore, when dealing with other people it is important that we treat them with the respect that they deserve.

This rule holds for every dealing between people, but it matters more in some dealings than in others, and sexual ones are near the top. When I buy a loaf of bread I am using the baker as a means to my breakfast, and he is using me as a means to his rent. Neither of us minds, because very little of either of us is at stake in the exchange. In a sexual relationship a great deal is at stake: desires, feelings, trust, and sometimes a person’s whole idea of himself or herself. The more of a person that goes into an interaction, the more of that person there is to be used, and so the rule against using people becomes more important to follow here than it is at the bakery.

When two people enter into a sexual relationship, be it for one hour or five years, they are both investing time and effort in order to achieve their own ends, but they must take into account each other’s needs also. In this way a sexual relationship can be compared to a contractual agreement.² Both parties must come to an agreement that will bring satisfaction to each of them, and once these guidelines have been set, it is required by the contractual nature of the agreement that both parties live up to their promises.

Now if both parties can come to an agreement that will bring mutual satisfaction, and both sides live up to their agreement, then the interaction will be morally permissible.³ Therefore homosexuality is morally permissible as long as both parties treat each other as ends in themselves and do not use each other simply as tools of satisfaction. Since there is nothing inherent in homosexual relations that would make this mutual respect impossible or improbable, it can be of a morally permissible nature.

It is quite obvious that this argument is based on the deontological perspective. The major premise states that it is immoral to treat someone as simply a means to an end. This is the categorical imperative of Immanuel Kant’s deontological theory. The next premise, which states that a contractual agreement requires that both parties live up to their promises, is also deontological, and it follows from the categorical imperative in a way that Kant himself points out. His example is the man who borrows money on a promise he does not intend to keep.⁴ Such a man is using the lender’s trust as a tool, and so is treating him merely as a means. And if everyone made promises this way, nobody would believe a promise, so the maxim cannot be willed as a universal law either. Both of Kant’s tests condemn it. A sexual agreement is a promise of the same kind. To make it and then break it is to use the other person’s trust as a tool of satisfaction, which is just what the major premise forbids. So the second premise is Kant’s rule applied to promises.

Objection

The objection grants that the two parties may agree to whatever they like, and denies that their agreement settles the moral question. What settles it is the purpose that sexual acts have by nature, and no agreement between the parties can change that purpose.

Even though it is important to always treat a person as having his or her own needs or goals, especially in relationships involving sexual intimacies, it is not the factor that decides the ethical permissibility of the act. It is important to realize the purposes that certain acts serve in order to use them rightly. The natural purpose of sexual relationships is procreation:

“...the emission of semen ought to be so ordered that it will result in ...the production of proper offspring....” “...every emission of semen, in such a way that generation cannot follow, is contrary to the good for man....sins of this type are called contrary to nature...”⁵

Therefore, sexual acts that are contrary to their natural purpose of procreation are morally impermissible.

The objection should be stated carefully here, because it is easy to make it say more than it does. It does not forbid an injured husband or an infertile wife from having sexual relations, even though the end result cannot be a child. Their act is still of the kind from which generation follows, and if it fails to generate, that is an accident of the body and not a fault of the act. What the objection forbids is an act of a kind from which generation cannot follow at all. Homosexuality, which by definition involves members of the same sex, is an act of that kind. It is therefore contrary to nature and not morally permissible, whatever the parties have agreed to and however well they treat one another.

This argument is deontological in its conception, and not, as one might first think, consequential. A consequentialist judges each act by what comes of it. He would have to treat the sterile couple and the fertile couple who use contraception alike, since in neither case does a child result. The objection does the opposite. It permits the sterile couple and forbids the contracepting one, because it judges by the kind of act and not by the outcome. It is governed by a rule, to the effect that whatever is contrary to nature is wrong, and the rule is applied whatever the consequences turn out to be.

Reply

The objection that homosexuality is morally prohibited because it is unnatural cannot be allowed. In this argument, the word “unnatural” is not clearly defined. It could mean contrary to the laws of nature, uncommon, or just artificial. And even if a satisfactory definition for “unnatural” can be found, it must still be proven that “unnatural” necessarily implies wrong or bad. I will take the three meanings in turn, and then come back to the idea of a natural purpose, which is where the objection finally rests.

First of all, the laws of nature describe interactions that take place and do not prescribe what ought to happen.⁶ If you throw a rock into the air, it will come back down. This is a natural consequence of gravity, a law of nature. Now if the rock didn’t come back down we wouldn’t call it perverted, we would just realize that the law must be amended to include this observation. As experience shows us new things, we have to adjust our descriptions of the world in order to accept these new developments.

Now if “unnatural” is taken to mean that homosexuality is contrary to the laws of nature, the previous statement shows that this is a poor reason to condemn it. Whatever this law of nature is that precludes homosexuality, it obviously fails to fully describe human relations, because homosexuality does exist. Therefore the “law” is in need of adjustment.

If “unnatural” is supposed to mean uncommon, then again it is a weak argument against homosexuality. Just because something is uncommon, that is no reason to condemn it.⁷ It may be uncommon for a person to make miniature dollhouses for a living, but this does not make the profession unnatural, nor bad or morally impermissible. To the contrary, the very fact that something is uncommon may make it more desirable than something that is common.

“Unnatural” is sometimes used as another term for “artificial,” but neither term automatically implies bad or wrong.⁸ If this were the case then wearing clothes or flying in an airplane would be wrong, for they are both artificial and unnatural. Most aspects of our lives these days are in one way or another removed from nature, but we don’t consider this to be wrong. Why then is homosexuality considered to be wrong on these grounds?

One last fallacy is that objects have one and only one natural purpose, and to use them for anything else is wrong. The principal use of a hammer is pounding nails, but should it be considered a sin to use it to crack open walnuts if nothing else is available?!⁹ Of course not. It has been said that sex has only one function, procreation, but most people realize that it can be very pleasurable and a meaningful expression of love. So should it be considered wrong for one man or woman to show love for another member of the same sex? Even if something is suited to do one thing well, this doesn’t mean it can do nothing else.

The objection’s own treatment of the sterile couple shows the trouble here. It permits their act, though no child can come of it, because the act is of the generative kind. But once the objector admits that an act can be right without achieving its purpose, the purpose has stopped doing the work. The shape of the act is doing it instead, and he owes us a reason why the shape should matter when the purpose is out of reach. The only reason on offer is that the other shape is “unnatural,” and we have just seen that this word, in each of its senses, does not imply wrong. So the objection goes in a circle. An act of the wrong kind is wrong because it is contrary to nature, and it is contrary to nature because it is an act of the wrong kind.

The purpose of this reply is to refute the objection that homosexuality can be considered wrong because it is unnatural. Both sides of the dispute are deontological. The argument rests on Kant’s rule that persons must never be treated merely as means, and the objection rests on a rule that whatever is contrary to nature is wrong. So the question cannot be settled by counting consequences. It has to be settled by asking which rule can be stated clearly and defended. Kant’s rule can be. The other, as I have tried to show, cannot. “Unnatural” means contrary to the laws of nature, or uncommon, or artificial, and under none of these readings does it imply wrong; and the attempt to rescue it by appeal to the natural purpose of the act assumes what it was supposed to prove. Therefore, I would say that the objection fails and the argument stands. Homosexuality is morally permissible on the same terms as any other sexual relationship: that both parties treat each other as ends in themselves and keep the agreement they have made.

Notes

1. Raymond A. Belliotti, “A Philosophical Analysis of Sexual Ethics,” in Social Ethics, p. 211.

2. Belliotti, p. 201.

3. Belliotti, p. 212.

4. Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. H. J. Paton, Harper Torchbook ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), pp. 90, 96–97; Ak. 4:422, 4:429–430. The false promise is the example Kant uses under both the universal-law and the humanity formulations.

5. Thomas Aquinas, On the Truth of the Catholic Faith, Book Three, “Providence,” Part II, trans. Vernon J. Bourke, in Social Ethics, p. 200.

6. Burton M. Leiser, “Homosexuality and the ’Unnaturalness Argument’,” in Social Ethics, p. 216.

7. Leiser, p. 218.

8. Leiser, p. 220.

9. Leiser, p. 219.

Belliotti, Aquinas, and Leiser are cited from Social Ethics, second edition.

Editorial note, 2026: the anthology is Thomas A. Mappes and Jane S. Zembaty, eds., Social Ethics: Morality and Social Policy, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1982). Its chapter on sexual morality reprints Raymond A. Belliotti, “A Philosophical Analysis of Sexual Ethics,” pp. 210–214, from the Journal of Social Philosophy 10, no. 3 (1979), and Burton M. Leiser, “Homosexuality and the ’Unnaturalness Argument’,” pp. 215–220, from his Liberty, Justice, and Morals (New York: Macmillan, 1973). The Aquinas passage is quoted in the editors’ introduction, pp. 199–200, from Summa Contra Gentiles, Book III, Part II, in Bourke’s translation, On the Truth of the Catholic Faith (Garden City, N.Y.: Image Books, 1956). The page numbers in the notes are as typed in 1985 and have been left alone.